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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CLYDE C. LEWIS and VERONA
D. LEWIS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs.-

CIVIL NO.
7807

CLARA A. WHITE and KATHRYN
\VHITE,
Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF CASE
The statement of the case made by the appellants
is so brief that the same does not, in our opinion, give
the Court sufficient information to enable it to properly
dispose of the questions which appellants seek to have
reviewed. We shall therefore call the attention of the
Court to the evidence which we deem material to the
issues raised by the pleadings.
As stated in appellants' brief, the· plaintiffs brought
this action to recover the possession of a motel located at
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Pleasant Grove in Utah County, Utah. Plaintiffs based
their claimed right to declare a forfeiture of the contract
upon a provi8ion therein contained which provided:
"In the event of a failure to comply with the
terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure to
make any payments when the same shall become
due or within thirty days thereafter, the Seller
shall, at his option, be released from all obligations in law and equity to convey said property
and all payments which have been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for the
non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer
agrees that the Seller may, at his option, re-enter
and take possession of the said premises without
legal process as in its first and former estate, together will all improvements and additions made
by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and
improvements shall remain with the land and become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller. It is
agreed that time is the essence of this agreement."
Plaintiffs demanded judgment that they be restored
to the possession of the premises; that they be awarded
damages for the unlawful detainer of the premises from
and after the 23rd day of August, 1950; that such damages be trebled and for costs. (R. 3-4)
To the Complaint defendants filed an Answer and
Counterclaim in which they admitted that, they, on May
1, 1949, entered into a contract for the purchase of the
motel and the furnishings therein; that at the time the
contract was entered into the sum of $10,256.21 was paid
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by the defendants on the purehase price and that since
the contract was executed an additional $3594.14 had
been paid: that the defendants, by and with the consent
of the plaintiffs, had renwdeled the kitchen in the motel
at a cost of $836.00 of which amount $100.00 was derived
from the sale of s01ne of the furniture in the motel to
which sale the plaintiff, Clyde C. Lewis, consented. Defendants denied that the reasonable rental of the motel
was $350.00 per month and alleged that such rental did
not exceed $150.00 per month.
~ls a further defense and counterclaim, defendants
alleged that prior to and at the time the contract for the
sale and purchase of the motel was entered into, the
plaintiffs falsely and for the purpose of inducing the defendants to enter into the contract for the purchase of
the motel represented that the same had been and was
producing a monthly income of not less than $1000.00
per month; that the same was well insulated and well provided with sewage disposal; that in fact the motel was
not and had not been producing to exceed $225.00 per
month; that the building was not properly insulated or
well provided with sewage disposal ; that in reliance on
such false representations and not otherwise, the defendants entered into the contract for the purchase of the
motel. Defendants further alleged that by reason of
the fraud perpetrated upon them they had been damaged in the sum of $30,000.00. Defendants further alleged
that the provisions of the contract relied upon by the
plaintiffs as the basis for their claimed right to declare
a forfeiture and to retain the amount paid on the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
tract as liquidated damages was null and void in that
the san1e constitutes a penalty and not liquidated damages and as such is against public policy. By their amended answer and counterclaim, defendants prayed judgment that plaintiffs take nothing by their Complaint and
that defendants be awarded judgment against the plaintiffs for the sum of $30,000.00.
Upon a Motion of the defendants, the Trial Court
struck the Counterclaim. Upon application of the defendants for a Writ, this Court ordered the Counterclaim reinstated. White v. District Court, 282 Pac. (2d)
7'85. Upon the Counterclaim being reinstated, the plaintiffs filed a Reply in which they denied generally the
new matters set up in defendants' Amended Answer and
Counterclaim. (R. 17)
At the commencement of the trial it was stipulated:
That the plain tiffs are the owners of the property described in the Complaint; that on August 1, 1951 the
amount of payments that had accrued under the contract amounted to $4,672.50, of which amount the defendants had paid $3341.14 which amount does not include the down payment. That at the time of serving the
notice upon the defendants to vacate the premises, they
were in arrears in their payment according to the terms
of the contract in the sum of $1078.36. (R. 7) That defendants received notice of termination of the contract
on August 17, 1950.
The plaintiffs offered and there was received in
evidence the Contract involved in this controversy. Plaintiffs' Exhibit A. Perris D. Jensen, one of counsel for
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plaintiffs, was sworn and identified certain letters
marked B, C and D which he claims were written to Mrs.
\Yhite, but upon objection of the defendants the same
were not adinitted. The letters do not appear in the
record brought here on appeal. (Tr. 10 to 13)
Plaintiff, Clyde C. Lewis, was called as a witness
on his own behalf and testified that he resides at 269·6
Yerona Circle, Holladay; that he has been in the real
estate business for 35 or 40 years; that he is a contractor
and builder; (Tr. 1-1) that the approxirnate rental value
of the nwtel nrentioned in the contract here involved on
August 17, 1950 was $350.00 per month, which was the
amount that he leased the same to Miss Carruth; that
in the summer he got $3.00 per room a day; that at
times he got $3.50 per day; that there are 19 rooms besides the kitchen and dining room; that each room had
a toilet, shower and basin, it also had gas and is located
on the main highway at Pleasant Grove; that more
money was n1ade in the summer than in the winter; that
the property should bring in more than $350.00 per
month, probably about $400.00-$500.00 a rnonth as an
average in both surnmer and winter. (Tr. 16)
An attempt was made to show the amount of premium that was paid on the fire insurance policy on the
property, but objections to such testimony was sustained.
(Tr. 17-20)
On cross examination, Mr. Lewis testified that in his
opinion the reasonable market value of the property here
involved was the price it was sold for; (Tr. 21) that the
property should rent for $400.00 or $'500.00 per rnonth on
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August 17, but he did not tell Mrs. White about what it
would rent for; that Mrs. White did not inquire from
him as to what this property was bringing at the time
of the deal; that the property was leased to Miss Carruth at $350.00 per month; (Tr. 22) that Miss Carruth
cmnplained that the rent was too high and he reduced the
rent to $300.00 per month; that he did not try to lease
the property to Miss Carruth when her lease expired
for $300.00 per month but she tried to lease it from him;
(Tr. 23) that when he talked to Miss Carruth about
leasing the property after her lease was up, she said
$300.00 was too much; that in his opinion the property
would bring more than $300.00 or $350.00 per month;
and would bring $400.00 or $500.00 a month. (Tr. 24)
That he didn't tell Mrs. White· anything about the rent
that the motel was bringing nor did she ask; (Tr. 25)
that during the summer season the rooms should rent
for $3.50 per night; (Tr. 27) that he did not think all
of the rooms could be rented every night; that a Mr.
Lyons was in charge of the motel for about a month
after Miss Carruth quit and he left the rental up to Mr.
Lyons;· that he didn't tell Mrs. White that Mr. Lyons
would give her information about the property; that he
had only seen Mrs. White once; (Tr. 27) that he didn't
tell Miss Carruth anything about the property; that he
dealt directly with Miss Carruth in renting the property
and collecting the rent; (Tr. 28) that Miss Carruth did
not tell him what she was getting, but merely told him
that the rent was too high; that he wants to keep the
home that Mrs. White conveyed to him for which she re-
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ceived a credit of $l0,:2:lO and gPt back the nwtel; ( rrr.
:29) that he never talked to "Jlr~. \Yhite about the sewer
or renwdeling the kitchen until after the contract was
executed and she wanted to have hiln do s01nething about
enlarging the kitchen and he refused to do anything. (Tr.
30) That he never at any ti1ue had any conversation
with "Jirs. 'Yhite about the inc01ue of the property; (Tr.
31) that a ::\Irs. Hale was in charge of the property before ::\[iss Carruth, but he did not know where she is. (Tr.
·~·))
.)_

Thomas ,Y. Davies was called as a witness by plaintiffs and testified that he was and for ten or twelve years
had been in the real estate business principally in Salt
Lake County, but had some experience with property in
rtah County: that he is familiar with the property involved in this controversy; that the market value of that
propert}~ on ~\ugust 20, 1950 was around $40,000.00, between $35,000.00 and $40,000.00; that there are 19 units
in the motel and during the tourist season half of the
units should average $2.50 to $3.00 a night; that during
the winter season each unit should rent for $35.00 per
month which would be 19 times 35 (Tr. 37); that would
be $1565.00 income per month which the building should
bring in. (Tr. 38) That the reasonable rental value of
the property is around $300.00 per month; that a caretaker could be secured for $125.00 per month along with
lodging. ( Tr. 39)
On cross-examination, he testified that the amount
that property has been producing has a bearing on what
the property wi.ll lease or sell for; (Tr. 41) that if the
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19 units wa::; only producing $300.00 per month, it could
not be well1nanaged; (Tr. 43) that the building constituting the motel was moved from the steel plant because
there was no longer any use for it there. (Tr. 44-45)
The defendant, Mrs. Clara A. White, was called as a
witness in her own behalf and testified that she resides
at the motel at Pleasant Grove; (Tr. 46) that she signed
the contract here involved at her home in Farmington;
that the plaintiff came up there with Mr. Chidester and
then he came up there with a lady; that he came to her
home twice before she signed the contract; that when the
plaintiff was up there with Mr. Chidester the plaintiff
''told me that he would like to see me have the motel,
that I could make more money there, I could make a
thousand dollars a month clear. He told me it was producing a thousand dollars a month at that time. He
wasn't making so much out of it because all the time he
had rented it or leased it and he only got $350.00 per
nwnth for the monthly payments on the lease." "He said
there wasn't a fruit room, but he would make one in the
basement-He said he would enlarge the kitchen-" that
thereafter she went down to see the motel; (Tr. 48) that
she also had a conversation with the plaintiff when he
was there with his wife before the contract was executed;
that on both occasions she had a conversation with the
defendant as to what the motel was producing; that her
daughter was present at the time of the conversation had
with Mr. Lewis and his wife; (Tr. 49) that when he came
up with his wife, Mr. Lewis stated when Miss Carruth
was there she had made a thousand dollftrs a month, but
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he didn't get 1nuch out of it because he only rented it to
her and he got $3'50.00 per nwnth, and she had never
failed to pay it, but he knew she was 1naking a great deal
more than that; that the conversation had with Mr.
Lewis when his wife was there was before she signed the
contract; that ~Ir. Lewis told her that when she went to
see the motel ~Ir. Lyon would be there and would give her
any additional infor1nation that she Inight desire; that
she saw :1\Ir. Lyon when she went to see the motel and
~Ir. Lyon stated to her that there were seven men staying
there who were paying $2.50 per day. (Tr. 50) That when
she took over the motel she learned that the men were
paying only $1.00 per day; that she relied on what :Mr.
Lewis told her about the income from the motel and
would not have bought the place if she had known it
wasn't producing that amount; that she told Mr. Lewis
that she had no income except what she had made out of
her place; (Tr. 51) that after she signed the contract,
Mr. Lewis told her that she could sell the furniture that.
was not in use and take the money and apply it on enlarging the kitchen. ·That she sold 20 chrome chairs and
30 of her own for $100.00 which she used to help pay the
cost of enlarging the kitchen which cost approximately
$900.00. A receipt marked Defendant's Exhibit "2" which
Mrs. White testified was for labor performed in enlarging the kitchen was received in evidence. There was also
received in evidence a letter written by the defendant,
Clyde C. Lewis, which is n1arked Defendants' Exhibit 1.
~Irs. Lewis further testified that she purchased lumber
for making the improvements from the Alpine Lumber
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( ~o1npan~'. (Tr. 51) That she went into possession of the

motel on ~lay 1, 1949 and in order to get people to come
to the motel she has had special cards printed for posters,
put advertising at the library, at the Geneva Plant and in
the paper. rl,hat in 1949 she took in $137.00 from tourists and in 1950, $127.00; that she had taken in less during
the year 1951; that she had some other income; during
four months she had only two boarders at $17.00 a week;
( Tr. G-1-) that she had an average of four boarders who
paid $17.00 a week for board and room; that she can get
$10.00 a week for a room if she furnishes maid service
and towels; (Tr. 55-56) that it costs her around $5.00 a
week for laundry for towels, sheets and slips for four
1nen when she sends it out; that during the second World
\Var she had 35 boarders in Salt Lake and 12 boarders
at her house out in Farmington; that she ran a boarding
house for eight years and made sufficient to take care of
her family; that she asked ~Ir. Lyon for his books, but
he said that there were no books kept, only his receipt
book and she did not see it; that her daughter who signed
the contract has been residing with her at the motel; that
before the contract was entered into, Mr. Lewis said that
the sewer was adequate; that she was compelled to have
the sewer cleaned out within three weeks from the time
she moved in which costs $40.00 each time. It must be
cleaned out twice a year and there is no sewer system,
but just cesspool and a septic tank. (Tr. 57) That Mr.
Lewis stated that the motel was thoroughly insulated,
but there is very little insulation and only black paper
between the inside and outside walls; that when she· went
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to

~ee

the Inotel ~fr. Lyon ~howed her four romns and
the others were all occupied and he did not wi~h to disturb the occupants. ( Tr. 58)
On cross-exrunination, ~lr~. \Yhite testified that the
seeond tin1e that she had a conversation with n1r. Lewis,
he told her that she could n1ake $1000.00 a month down
there; that ~Iiss Carruth had made that; that she had a
doubt in her 1nind when he first told her, but after repeatedly telling her, she believed him. ( Tr. 59-60) That the
first time she had the conversation with Mr. Lewis was
in April; that ~Ir. Lewis brought his wife about two
weeks after the first visit; (Tr. 63) that both conversations took place before Easter Sunday; that she didn't
see :\Ir. Lewis at F·armington after she signed the preliminary contract. (Tr. 64) ~J rs. White was crossexamined at some length about what Mr. Lewis told her,
but in the main her testimony was a repetition of what
she testified to on her direct examination.
On being cross-examined as to why she did not ask
:Miss Carruth what she made while running the motel,
:\Irs. White testified that she did not think anyone knew
where she was; that she asked a number of people where
she was, but she was not in Utah. (Tr. 80) That she didn't
know of her own knowledge that it didn't bring in a
$1000.00 per month; that Mr. Lewis did not say whether
the $1000.00 a month was net or gross; that when she
first went into the motel the highway in front of the
motel was not torn up; but it was torn up later and the
road was finished in October; that when the street was
torn up, they had to go around to the back; that while the
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street was torn up, it probably temporarily affected the
income from the motel. (Tr. 82-83) Mrs. White further
testified that at one time after she got the notice of eviction she talked to Mr. Jensen about being given a chance
to pay up her back payments and Mr. Jensen said he
would see Mr. Lewis, but he doubted if Mr. Lewis would
give her any additional time. (Tr. 107) That Mr. Jensen
did not agree to accept $100.00 a week until the arrears
were paid up. (Tr. 109) That she borrowed money on
her furniture, rings and car to pay up what she owed
as of June 23rd; (Tr. 109) that Mr. Jensen did not give
her any time to make up the defaulted payments. (Tr.
111)

On re-direct examination, Mrs. White testified that
she was in error as to the cost of fixing the fruit room
instead of $200.00, it was $80.00. (R. 114) Mrs. White
further testified that she tried to arrange with Mr. J ensen to pay $100.00 a week until she got caught up with
her payments, but Mr. Jensen did not so agree and she
took the letter over to Mr. Dalton and she raised approximately $1600.00 on her furniture, rings, jewelry and car
which she paid in a lump sum after she had the conversation with Mr. Jensen. (Tr. 116) Exhibit 3 is a receipt
for $1694.14 for the mol).ey paid on June 12, 1950.
Leon E. Smith, a witness called by defendants testified that he stayed at the motel while Miss Carruth operated it and for a few days after Mrs. White took it over;
that he was there when Mr. Lyon had charge; that he was
paying $1.00 per day for his room. (Tr. 90); that while
Miss Carruth was operating the motel, the sewer backed
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up and ran into the romn; (Tr. 91) that while he was
there it was a rare occasion that cars were parked there
except those who stayed there; that there would be two to
five, usually just two cars parked at the motel each night.
(Tr. 92)
:\laud Carruth was called as a witness by the defendants and testified that she had a lease on the motel at
Pleasant Grove ~larch 4, 1948 to April1, 1949 at $3'50.00
per Inonth ~ (Tr. 119-120) that while she operated the
motel she kept informed as to every public occurrence
that took place in Utah County; that when the B.Y. had
an intercollegiate meet she got in touch with the coach,
that she advertised in Southern Utah at conference time;
that she had cards printed which she distributed to her
guests and 1nailed out all over the county; (Tr. 121)
that during the year she operated the motel her total receipts were $4201.7·5; that she did not continue to pay
$330.00 ($350.00) a month during the time she operated
the motel; that she couldn't take in enough money to pay
Mr. Lewis from the income from the motel, but had to
draw on her bank account; ('Tr. 122) that she finally
prevailed upon Mr. Lewis to reduce the rent to $300.00
per month; that she paid $350.00 for 4 or 5 months and
$300.00 for the remainder; (Tr. 123) Miss Carruth further testified that she had a number of conversations
with Mr. Lewis in which she told him that she didn't
make $300.00 a month; that the motel w·as in the wrong
location to which Mr. Lewis said "I think you are right";
(Tr. 125) that she repeatedly told Mr. Lewis that she
couldn't meet the payments of rent; (Tr. 127) that after
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paying for the utilities there was not enough left to pay
$300.00. (Tr. 128) She further testified that she first
met 1\lrs. White one week ago Saturday; (Tr. 129) that
she has had experience in operating a tea room at Coalville, Utah; a resident hotel in Washington, D.C. On
cross-examination she testified that the only experience
she has had in operating a motel was the one belonging
to ~fr. Lewis. (Tr. 112)
Lawrence Atwood was called as a witness by the defendants and testified that he is engaged in the real estate business; (Tr. 135) that he served as a County
Assessor of Utah County for about 14 years. Counsel
for the plaintiff asked and was granted leave to examine
the witness on voir dire. Such examination was quite
extensive and will be found in Transcript 136-146. Mr.
Atwood testified that he had examined the Lewis Motel
and being asked a hypothetical question he stated that in
his opinion the Lewis Motel on ~fay 1, 1949 had a market
value of $14,165 if it was producing $350.00 per month,
and if it was or had been producing $1000.00 per month,
its market value would be about $42,500.00. (Tr. 147-148)
~r r. Atwood was cross-examined at some length but did
not change his opinion. (Tr.148-165)
Thomas H. Heal was called as a witness by the defendants and in part testified as follows: That he is and
since 1914 has been engaged in the real estate business,
that he has handled all kinds of real estate deals, farms,
homes, ranches, apartments, motels, most everything in
real estate. In answer to a hypothetical question he expressed the opinion that if the value of the property as
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of :Jiay 1. 1949 wa~ fixed at $42,500 a fair value if it was
bringing in $350.00 n nwnth would be $14,166.00. His
cross-exan1ination (Tr. 17~-E)~ and 194 to 197) did not
change his opinion.
Ralph Chmnberlain was called as a witness by defendants and testified that he was fan1iliar with the motel
that :J[rs. \Yhite had been operating; that he stayed at
that place while 1Iiss Carruth operated it; (Tr. 198)
and while ~Ir. Lyon was there; that upon 3 or -! occasions
the sewer would boil back into the shower and make it
quite unpleasant~ (Tr. 199) that when he was there some
spots were not covered with insulation and several of the
braces were broken; that while he was there he did not
see more than six transients stop there in a month; (Tr.
200) that he helped unplug sewer pipes while Miss Carruth was there. (Tr. 201)
Harold vVootten was called as a witness and testified
that he resides at Pleasant Grove and has had experience
as a builder. (Tr. 209) That he did work for Mrs. White
in repairing plumbing and enlarging the kitchen at the
motel operated by Mrs. White; (Tr. 210) that he took
out a partition, put in a doorway and lined it on both
sides, put in extra lights, took out the meter box and reinforced the top of the kitchen; (Tr. 212) that he also
changed the electric system; (Tr. 213) that of the money
paid him by l\Irs. White, about $700.00 or $750.00 was
for enlarging the kitchen; (Tr. 214) that he did other
work in repairing the building and moving the insulation; (Tr. 215-216) that the cesspool was improperly
constructed. ('Tr. 217) On cross-examination, he· testified that he was not a licensed electrician or plumber
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when he did the work for l\1 rs. White, but had had considerable experience in that kind of work. (Tr. 221)
Ralph Hahn was called as a witness for the defendant::; and testified that he resided at Provo and was a
real estate salesman by occupation; (Tr. 238) that he is
acquainted with the motel occupied by :Mrs. White: (Tr.
~~H) that if the property had a gross income on ~Iay 1,
1949 of $350.00 per month, its market value in his opinion would be $15,000.00, if it had an income of $1000.00
per month, it would be worth about three times that; (Tr.
~-+ 1) that because of its construction it would in his opinion be worth 38 to 40 thousand. (Tr. 242) :Jfr.
Hahn was cross-examined at great length. (Tr. 243-264)
Among other matters he was asked what effect if any
would be the effect on the income of the motel if Rita
Hayworth or Jim Farley were operating the apartment.
(Tr. 253) He was further re-cross examined (Tr. 267 to
:275) but his testimony as to value was not changed.

Darleene Rogas, a witness called by defendants testified that she on Easter Sunday, April 17, 1949 in company with l\irs. White went to the motel which ~Irs.
""\Vhite later operated; that she met Mr. Lyon who was
in charge of the motel on the day she went with Mrs.
White; that My Lyon stated to Mrs. White that he had
seven rooms rented at $2.50 to steady roomers and the
other rooms rented to transients at $4.50 and $5.00 a
room. (Tr. 276-277) Mrs. White was recalled and testified that Mr. Lyon made out and gave her a list of the
furniture; (Tr. 280-281) that when she checked the list
with the furniture in the motel, there was missing three
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night stand~, three or four occasional chairs, there were
no XaYajo rugs: but that there were three rugs (Tr. 281)
there were only 1~ large beds; that all of the furniture
except that which was sold and the three rugs and linen
that has worn out is all still there. (Tr. 282)
Edwin Butterworth was called as a witness by the
plaintiffs (out of order) and testified that he is and
for 44 years he has been in the real estate business at
Salt Lake City, Utah; that he heard a conversation at his
office in Salt Lake between Mr. Chidester and Mrs.
White about a week or a week and a half before Mrs.
White entered into the contract to purchase the motel;
that he thought :Mrs. White expressed some doubt if she
could make a go of the motel, and that Mr. Chidester
said "If you take in some boarders in connection with
that thing, I believe it will be possible to make the thing
go." (Tr. 289-290) Mr. Butterworth testified that the
market value of the motel on April26, 1949 was $42,000.00. (Tr. 294) On cross-examination, Mr. Butterworth
testified that motels and other buildings used as commercial property, income is a very important matter; that in
taking listings of property he always puts the income
thereof in the listing. A determining factor with a purchaser is income. (Tr. 296) Mr. Butterworth was asked
the following questions and he gave the following answers:

"Q.

Assuming that this property was actually
bringing in a gross income of $350.00 a month
a year prior to the execution of this contract,
and it was represented to have been produc~
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ing a thousand dollars a month during that
period of time, would that be a very important matter to take into consideration in the
purchase~

"A. Absolutely.
Q. Would you give us a judgment as to the diffe-rence in value, other things being equal between a piece of property, a motel that 'was
bringing in $350.00 per month and a motel
that was bringing in a thousand dollars a
month, the relative difference in value~
"A. I would say it would be in the direct proportion to the income--three times as much as
you indicate." (Tr. 297)
Kathryn White, one of the defendants, was called
and testified on behalf of the defendants. She testified
that she participated in the negotiations leading up to
the execution of the contract for the sale and purchase
of the motel at 'Pleasant Grove. (Tr. 299) That Mr.
Lewis came up with Mr. Chidester to see her mother's
home at F'armington; that Mr. Lewis said that he had
a motel at Pleasant Grove for sale that was bringing
in a thousand dollars a month and that it was leased for
$350.00 per month; that the lessee had given up the lease
and a Mr. Lyons was in charge of the property; that Mr.
Lewis looked over the house and grounds of her mother's
property at F'armington; (Tr. 300) that about a week
after his first visit to Farmington, Mr. Lewis came up
there with a woman he introduced as his wife; that at the
second trip Mr. Lewis stated that the motel at Pleasant
Grove had been bringing $1000.00 per month and Miss
Carruth had been paying a rental of $350.00 per month;
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that :Jir. Lewis said he would enlarge the kitchen; that at
the tin1e of the second Yisi t of nlr. Lewis she and her
mother had been down and seen the 1notel at Pleasant
Grove. (Tr. ~~0:2) That }[r. Lyon showed then1 through
the n1otel; that he stated that the ones who were permanent renters paid $2.50 a night and he was getting $4.50
for one party and $5.00 for two; (Tr. 302) that she
signed the contract with her mother but she had given
her mother a Quit Claim Deed to the property; that when
~Ir. Lewis first stated that the motel was and had been
bringing in $1000.00 per month, she did not believe him,
but he kept repeating it until she did believe him and
she would not have signed if l\Ir. Lewis had not told them
that it had been producing $1000.00per month; (Tr. 303)
that she and her mother have been operating the motel
since the contract was signed; that the furniture is still
in the motel except that which was sold and that which
has worn out; that the day after they moved in they began having trouble with the sewer backing up; (Tr.
305); that when she and her mother took possession of
the motel there were seven roomers who were paying
$1.00 per day; that since they have been operating the
motel she believes the average number of roomers has
been less than four; that one year they made $137.00
on transient trade and the next year $127.00; that they
have charged $3.00 for one transient person and $3.50
for two. (Tr. 306) On cross-examination, Kathryn White
was asked if Mr. Lewis told her where Miss Carruth resided and she said he did not and that she did not know
where :Miss Carruth lived. (Tr. 309)
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Joseph Lyon was called as a witness by plaintiffs
and testified that he was and for about 20 years has been
in the hotel business; (Tr. 316) that on Easter Sunday
1949 he showed Mrs. and Miss White some of the rooms
in the motel at Pleasant Grove; that at that time there
were nine rooms occupied; the persons occupying the
romns were permanent guests paying $7.00 a week; (Tr.
318) that he didn't recall whether Mrs. White asked to
see the books that were being kept; that he didn't offer
to show her the books; that he told Mrs. White that she
could not step right in and make as much as she thought
in the rnotel business; that it would take a little time to
build up the business, but a rooming or boarding house
would be all right. (Tr. 319) That he told her she should
be able to make $600.00 a month on her rooms and $400.00
a month on food or a thousand dollars a month; that he
didn't tell Mrs. White what had been made out of the
motel because he did not know that; that he was in charge
of the motel during the month of April and a day or two
in March; that he left on the first of May; that he did not
show Mrs. White the books when she was there on Easter
Sunday; (Tr. 320) that Mrs. White may have asked for
the books but he had no authority to show the books to
anyone; that on the day Mrs. White took over he bought
a ledger and wrote in it the seven roomers who were
there; ( Tr. 321) that during the month that Mr. Lyon
was operating the motel the income was around $250.00,
"I think $255.00." (Tr. 333)
Plaintiffs' Exhibit G, was offered and received in
evidence. (Tr. 333) That exhibit shows that the total
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income of the property for one day in ~larch and :27
days in April to be $255.00.
The plaintiff wa~ recalled and in rebuttal testified:
That the first tirne he went to Farmington to see Mrs.
\Yhite, :Jlr. Chidester went with hin1; that he had a conversation with :Jirs. \Yhite in which he told Mrs. White
that it was leased at $3'50.00 and he cut it down to $300.00; that when asked about the income frmn the rnotel, he
told the defendants that he had no way of knowing; that
he told her it had never brought in what it should have,
but that "-as practically all that was said about it; that
in the conversation he told Mrs. White that the property
should be run as a boarding house; (Tr. 338-339) that
~Ir. Lewis rnade a second visit to Farmington with his
wife; that on the second visit he talked about when Mrs.
White was 1noving; ~hat he never told Mrs. White and
her daughter that the rnotel had earned $1000.00 during
the time ~fiss Carruth had it. (Tr. 342) He did not think
anything was said about the cesspool or sewage in his
talk with ~Irs. White. (Tr. 344)
On cross-examination, ~fr. Lewis testified that he
thought Mrs. White made inquiry about the income of the
motel the first time he was up to Farmington; that he
told her it was leased for $350.00 and had been reduced
to $300.00; that he told Mrs. White that he had voluntarily reduced the rent to $300.00 because she (Miss
Carruth) thought it was too much; (Tr. 349) that he told
her (Mrs. White) that Miss Carruth asked to have the
rent reduced because she wasn't making any money;
that ~Irs. \Yhite said that she was going to run a board-
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ing house; that he didn't know what the motel brought
in; (Tr. 350) that Miss Carruth told him that the motel
was not bringing in ~no ugh to pay him $300.00 a month;
that l\1 iss Carruth told him that she would not take the
nwtel and pay $300.00 a month rent; that he didn't tell
l\1 rs. White that Miss Carruth had told him that she
couldn't pay $300.00 a month for the motel; that he didn't
think that was brought up; (Tr. 352-353) that he told
Mrs. White that he had reduced the rent from $350.00 to
$300.00 because Miss Carruth claimed the rent was too
high; that the second time he was up to Farmington the
1natter of the income of the motel was not mentioned;
(Tr. 355) that when he entered into this contract with
Mrs. White he knew that she had no means of paying for
the property except from the income she would receive
from the motel. (Tr. 357)
The plaintiff, Verona D. Lewis, was called as a witness and testified on behalf of the plaintiffs that she went
to Farmington with :\Ir. Lewis a short time before Mrs.
White moved; that she met and talked with Mrs. \Vbite
and her daughter, Kathryn; (Tr. 359) that Mrs. White
showed them through the house; that the Pleasant Grove
property was not mentioned in her presence. (Tr. 360)
Ben H. Davis was called as a witness by the plaintiffs and testified that he is a building contractor; (Tr.
364) that he has examined the motel building here involved; that the building is of standard construction except the dining room; ( Tr. 365) that the cost of constructing such a building on May 1, 1939 would be about
$9.00 a square foot. (Tr. 366) On cross-examination he
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testified that he spent about 15 1ninutes looking over
the building; that he ass tuned the roof was of standard
construction, but did not know frmn his own observation. (Tr. 368)
Defendant, Clyde C. Lewis, was again reealled
and further testified: He "·ns asked if he had extended
:Jirs. Lewis additional tin1e to pay the tin1e payments.
rpon objection being made that such testimony was immaterial and that if a waiver of the fraud was claimed
such waiver \Yas not pleaded, the objection was sustained. (Tr. 370-372)
Perris Jensen, one of the counsel for the plaintiffs,
was sworn and testified on behalf of the plaintiffs. After
being examined as to his experience in appraising property (Tr. 374-376 he testified that the value of the property based on income would not be in proportion to income because the cost of operation remains more or less
constant. (Tr. 378) He testified that in his opinion the
rental or income value of the motel is for 180 days of the
year $9,700.00 and the other six months $5,200.00 or a
total for the year of $14,900.00 (Tr. 380) and after deducting 25 or 30% for vacancies, the net gross rental is
$10,350 and the reasonable expense of operating should
be $6500.00 per year, that item includes $1200.00 forma~
aging and $1200.00 for maid service per year; that the
net income would be $3850.00; (Tr. 381) that there would
be no difference in the value of the property if it had
an income of $1000.00 per month and if it had an income
of $350.00 per month; (Tr. 382) that he has examined
the motel and it is properly constructed. (Tr. 383)
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On cross-examination, he testified that he was aware
that except in a case of real urgency and necessity our
Rupreme ( ~ourt has said it is improper for an attorney
to te~t if\' in his own case, but that he considered it urgent
that he tP~tif\ in this case; (Tr. 385) that the income
of property within limits is an important fact in deterlllining values; that the income of property may or may
not effect value; (Tr. 386); that considering income alone
and at $350.00 rental income, a building on that land
would have a value of about $1,000.00 that it would cost
about as much to manage a property bringing in $350.00
per month as it would for property bringing in $1000.00
per month, but only about one-half as much for maid
service; (Tr. 388) that if the property was bringing in
$350.00 per month gross income, the expense of operation would be $3950.00 a year or about $330.00 a month;
that if a motel brings in only $350.00 per month it would
be worth only about $1000.00 as a motel, but it might be
used for other purposes; that this property would make
a very splendid maternity hospital or convalescent home
or old folks home, or it could be adopted for use by the
students of the B.Y.U.; that he does not know that there
is a greater need for maternity homes than there is for
motels in that neighborhood; that he has not inquired
to find out how many women there are over in Pleasant
Grove who are looking for a maternity home; that the
rooms at the motel are about 11 foot rooms and that
three or four students could be put in one room; that the
rooms may be a little less than 13 feet in one dimension;
that Mrs. White would do well to get four children, boys
or girls into one room and get $15.00 each or $60.00; that
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she could get a bus to take the students to and from
school which would not eo~t 1nuch (Tr. 391) that if the
motel could not be n1ade to pay where it is, it 1night be
moved. (Tr. 392)
Cotmsel for plaintiff offered to show by .Mr. Lewis
that "The testi1nony was that the defendant, after she
had discovered the fraud and was in default on her payments, that she approached the plaintiff, Mr. Lewis, and
requested an extension of time to make her delinquent
payments and that Mr. Lewis agreed to give her an e-xtra
tin1e, which she did not thereafter accept and perform."
Upon objection the court stated that he had already ruled
on the offer. (Tr. 396)
Arthur Welles Anderson was called as a witness·
by the plaintiffs and testified that he put the plumbing
in the motel; that the material used was standard material; that the work of putting it in was done according
to the State Code of Utah; ( Tr. 398-399) that he put
in the heating plant at a cost of about $1800.00. (Tr.

400)
Mrs. Verona D. Lewis was recalled by defendants
and asked if while at the horne of Mrs. White in F·arrnington she said in words or in substance that Miss Carruth had been making oodles of money at the motel at
Pleasant Grove but her husband didn't get much of the
money because it was rented for $350.00 a month. She
answered "Indeed I did not, no sir." (Tr. 402) The defendants, Whites, testified that Mrs. Lewis did make such
statement. (Tr. 403 and 405); Mrs. White further testified that she had never been in Mr. Butterworth's office
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with l\1 r. Chidester and did not there talk with l\Ir.
Chidester concerning the income of the· motel; (Tr. 403)
~he further testified that she did not know anything
about the first agreement for the purchase of the motel
until after Mr. Lewis had been up to her home in Farmington. (Tr. 404)
After the Court gave its instructions to the jury,
counsel for the plaintiffs stated: "The plaintiffs except
to the Court's ruling denying the plaintiffs the right to
~how that the defendants, after having knowledge of the
fraud, requested an extension of time for payment of delinquent payments for the purpose of showing that the
defendants waived the fraud, if any."
The plaintiffs except the Court's ruling wherein the
court refused to instruct the jury that it must find that
the defendants must have reasonably relied upon the misrepresentations of the plaintiffs, if any. (Tr. 408)
The defendants took no exceptions to the Court's
instructions to the jury.
It will be noted that plaintiffs included in their requests for instructions to the jury the following: "You
are instructed that even if the plaintiff, Clyde Lewis,
made the statement that the income from the motel was
$1000.00 a month, prior to the signing of the contract,
if you find from the evidence that the defendants had
reasonable opportunity to determine th~ truth or falsity
of said statement, they had no right to rely upon the
statement and are not entitled to damages for such false
statement." (R. 19) It will be noted that the instruction just mentioned is not marked as having been acted
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upon which is doubtless due to the fact that the request
was apparently not presented until after the verdict of
the jury was rendered. The verdict was rendered on
Septe1nber 27, 1951 (R. 35) while the request above
quoted appears fron1 the strunp of the clerk to have been
filed on September :2S, 1951. ( R. 19)
By its verdict, the jury found:

That the reasonable rental value of the premises
between ~lugust 23, 1950 and the present day to be $100.00 per month.
1.

2. That the plaintiffs misrepresented the income
that was being produced by the property.
3. That the plaintiffs misrepresented the condition
of the sewage system.

-t That the reasonable market value of the property on ~lay 1, 1949, was $14,000.00.
5. That if the property had been as represented and
was producing the income as represented by them, it
would have had a reasonable market value of $42,000.00.
6. That the plaintiffs agreed that defendants might
remodel and improve the property and receive credit
or payment therefor.
7. That the reasonable cost of the improvements
made was $800.00. (R. 34-35)
After the verdict was returned by the jury, the parties appeared in Court for the purpose of discussing the
judgment that should be rendered. Counsel for the defendants stated that the defendants were willing, if
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the Court could find that it might lawfully be done, to
have judgment rendered against them for the amount
clai1ned they were entitled to, including possession of
the property if defendants were awarded a judgment
for the difference as found by the jury between the actual
market value of the property and the market value it
would have if it had been as represented. Counsel for
plaintiffs stated that "we have nothing to say at this
time." (R. 410)
The Trial Court made Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and rendered its Judgment by which plaintiffs
were awarded possession of the real and personal property described in the contract for the sale and purchase
of the motel and the defendants were awarded a judgment against the plaintiffs for the sum of $23,642.64. (R.
41)
Plaintiffs appeal only from the money judgment
against them.
In the foregoing statement of the case, we may have
recited the evidence in greater detail than is usual, but in
our opinion the questions raised by the appellants on
this appeal are in the main disposed of by the facts testified to by the parties and found by the jury.

ARGUMENT
In our argument we have concluded first to discuss
the points raised by the appellants and then take up
some other ,points in the nature of cross assignments of
errors in support of the judgment appealed from.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
~-\X8\YER

TO

~-\PPELLANTS'

POINT ONE

THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFFS MADE
THE FALSE REPRESENTATIONS ALLEGED.

Fnder their Point One, it is stated that respondents
failed to establish the false representations alleged. It
is not clear whether they claim that defendants failed to
establish the false representations touching the matter
of the incmne that was being produced by the property
or only "·ith resp~t to the insulation and the sewage.
It is true, as plaintiffs allege, that defendants abandoned
all claim for da1nages on account of the insulation and
such question \Yas not submitted to the jury. There was
evidence offered which showed that the motel was poorly
insulated, but in light of the fact that the defendants examined the property before they signed the contract and
further that no evidence was offered which tended to
show the amount of damages occasioned by the defective
insulation, the defendants voluntarily abandoned any
claim for damages on that account. The claim for damages haVing been abandoned, that should end all controversy about insulation. However, there is evidence that
the motel was poorly insulated..Mrs. White testified that
Mr. Lewis told her that the motel was thoroughly insulated. That in fact there was very little insulation,
there is nothing between the insidewall and the outside
wall except black paper; that the ceiling has just very
little rock wool in it, and it is just in places where it is
all black the dust and dirt from the ceiling has come
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through so it shows in the dining room there is no insulation tll(~re. (Tr. 58)
On cross-examination she testified that she didn't
go up into the attic; that there are little cracks all up
and down the board where they are put together and
that she could put her finger through that "you could
take a lantern and look and all you can see is black
paper; that is no insulation there that I can see but I
'
can't go up in the attic because I can't climb." (Tr. 94)
That she first noticed that condition "the first winter
when we were there when the wind blew through." (Tr.
95) There is other evidence of similar import (See
testimony of Ralph Chamberlain) (Tr. 200) but in light of
the fact that defendants make no claim growing out of the
condition of the insulation, no useful purpose will be
served by going further into that phase of the case.
There is substantial evidence to the effect that the
sewage disposal system is inadequate and of course
defendant could not be expected to discover such fact
when she visited the property just before she signed
the contract for the purchase of the motel. As to the
sewage system, defendant, Clara A. White, testified
that when she was negotiating for the purchase of the
motel Mr. Lewis stated to her that the sewage system
was adequate; that she had to have the sewage system
cleaned out within three weeks after she moved down
there; that she had to have it cleaned out twice· a year;
that it costs $40.00 to have it cleaned out. (Tr. 57)
Leon E. Smith testified that when Miss Carruth was
operating the motel, the sewage backed up into his room.
(Tr. 91) Ralph Chamberlain testified that he stayed at
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the motel in question about 3 1nonths: that on three or
four occasions while he was there the sewage "boiled
back up into the shovler and just boiled over the cOinmode and 1nade it quite unpleasant.'' (Tr. 199)
Harold \Y ootten testified that he stayed at the
motel operated by .Jlrs. \Vhite fr01n Oct. 6, 1949 to Jan.
1951. That about once a week there would be a sewer
or something that would leak and we would have to
rean1 the seat out, which is very costly, takes special
tools. \Ye had to consistently clean out the sewer lines,
the slope wasn't adequate. (Tr. 214) That he was
"never to the bottom of the cesspool, but I would say the
cesspool definitely isn't deep enough; they didn't dig
it down until they hit a body of gravel. A cesspool has
to be into a large body of gravel or you can't dispose of
the water; they didn't have enough vents to take away
foul odors from the cesspool. I would say the drain is
not steep enough to take the water fast enough to take
the solids out; they consistently plugged and water running over and sewage come up into the room and several
times it has come up and right out on the floor; that
the people were consistently complaining about it." (Tr.

217)
The defendant Kathryn White testified that since
they have been operating the motel, they have had considerable trouble with the sewage system; that the day
after they moved in the sewer backed up; that she got it
fixed temporarily and within a month they got it cleaned
out; that it was necessary to have it cleaned out every
six months (Tr. 305); that when they were negotiating
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for the purchase of the motel, Mr. Lewis said the sewer
was adequate. (Tr. 306) Moreover, when the question
was asked the witnesses touching the market value of
the motel the matter of the inadequate means of disposing of the sewage was not included in the inquiry as to
values. If it be claimed by the plaintiffs under their
point one that respondents failed to prove a prima facie
case of false representations, the evidence including that
of the plaintiff, Clyde C. Lewis, is all to the effect that
false representations as to the income of the motel were
made by the defendant Clyde C. Lewis.
Defendant Clara A. White testified that the first
time Mr. Lewis came to see her at her home in Farmington, he told her that the motel was producing a
thousand dollars a month; that he had leased it but he
only got $350.00 per month; that when the plaintiff came
up to F·armington the second time he again told her
that while Miss Carruth had a lease on the property she
had made a thousand dollars per month and she had
never failed to pay; that both of these conversations
were had before the contract for the purchase of the
motel was signed. (Tr. 48-49) Mrs. White also testified
that when Mr. Lewis was up at Farmington on the second
occasion with his wife, the plaintiff Verona D. Lewis
stated that Miss Carruth had been making oodles of
money at the motel at Pleasant Grove, but that Mr.
Lewis didn't get much because he only got $350.00.
(Tr. 403)
The other defendant Kathryn White testified that
upon both of the occasions when Mr. Lewis was up to
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Farmington before the contract for the purchase of
the motel was signed, he repeatedly stated that the nwtel
was bringing in a thousand dollars a n1onth, but he had
it leased and was only getting $350.00 (Tr. 300-301-303);
that when ~Ir. Lewis and his wife were up there, his
wife, plaintiff Yerona D. Lewis, stated that Miss Carruth
had been n1aking oodles of money out of the motel at
Pleasant Grove but that ~lr. Lewis was not getting much
only $350.00 per month.
In connection with the testimony of the defendants
as to representations as to the income of the motel
just before the contract was signed, let us examine the
testimony of the plaintiff Clyde C. Lewis. When he was
first called as a witness and before Miss Carruth testified, .Mr. Lewis was asked these questions and gave these
answers:
"Q. Did you tell ~irs. White that the property
should rent for 4 or 5 hundred dollars a
month?
A. I never had an opportunity to tell Mrs. White
anything.
Q. Did you tell Mrs. White anything about what
it would rent for?
A. No sir.
Q. So that you mean to say Mrs. White bought
this property without making any inquiry
whatsoever as to what it was producing~
A. That I don't know. It was up to Mr. Chidester, he made the deal, what he told her I
don't know.
Q. You don't know anything about what Mr.
Chideste·r told her?
A. I don't know.
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Q.
A.

(l.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

lam asking what you told her.
I didn't tell her anything about it.
You rnean by that she didn't make any inquiry of you as to what this property was
bringing in at the time you made the deaU
~,hat is absolutely right.
Are you sure of that?
I am sure about it.
All right, you say it was renting for $350.00
about one month before this?
It was leased for one year for $350.00.
To Miss Carruth?
That's right." (Tr. 22)

l\fr. Lewis was then cross-examined as to his lease
to ~Iiss Carruth and among other things stated that he
reduced the rent because Miss Carruth told him the
rent was too much. (Tr. 23-24) _Mr. Lewis, after having
stated that the motel should rent for $400.00 or $500.00
per month, was asked:
"Q.
A.

Q.

You didn't tell ~Irs. White that did you?
I didn't tell Mrs. White anything.
She just went and made the deal without asking you a thing about what it was renting
for~

A.

That's right, as far as I was concerned, she
didn't ask me a thing. I didn't see her but
once before the deal was made.
Q. All right, that once you saw her, was that
thing discussed.
A. I 1nerely went up to look at her property,
she hadn't seen mine.
Q. But you didn't tell her a thing about what
it was bringing in ?
A. Absolutely not." (Tr. 25)
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Later on during the cross-exa1uination of
this occurred:

~[ r. Lewis

"Q. 1 ou 1nean to say you didn't tell 1\lr~. White
where she eould get the information about
this property, what it was renting for and
other infonnation necessary1
~l. I didn't tell ~Irs. White anything about the
property. I only saw her once. I w·ent up to
look at her property and she hadn't seen
nrine. 1Nhy should I go into what mine would
produce~

Q. I don't know why you should, but did you 1
~-\.. X o, I didn't.
Q. In other words, you didn't tell her a thing
about this property f'
To which question counsel for the plaintiffs objected
because the same question has been asked half a dozen
times. (Tr. 27-28)
He further testified that he did not participate in
the deal at all but merely signed the papers. (Tr. 28)
After ~Iiss Carruth had testified that during the
year she leased the property she took in a total of
$4201.75, which was not sufficient to pay the rent and
that she prevailed on Mr. Lewis after 4 or 5 months
to reduce the rent to $300.00 per month. (Tr. 119-128)
~Ir. Lewis was recalled and testified as follows:
The first time you went up did Mrs. White
1nake any inquiry whatsoever about the income of the property you had at Pleasant
Grove1
A. Well, I think she made that inquiry, yes.

"Q.
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Q.

All right, the first time you were there she
asked what it was bringing in and what did
you tell her?
A. I told her that it had been leased for $350.00
and had been reduced to $300.00.
Q. You told her that it had been leased for
$350.00 and been reduced to $300.00, is that
right~

A. That's right.
Q. Did you tell her why it had been reduced from
$350.00 to $300.00 ~
A. I made the statement yes, that she thought
it was too much and I voluntarily reduced it.
Q. Did you tell her why she thought it was too
much, ~Iiss Carruth~
A. Naturally because she wasn't making any
money, she wasn't taking in enough money
to pay that according to her statement.
(Tr. 349-350)
A comparison of the testimony of Mr. Lewis when
he was first called to testify and when he was recalled
to testify after :Miss Carruth had testified make it apparent why the jury was more than justified in not believing
the testimony of Mr. Lewis. Further on in the crossexamination of Mr. Lewis after much hedging, he testified that ~fiss Carruth possibly said she couldn't make
$300.00 a 1nonth out of the motel, but he didn't believe
he told Mrs. White what Miss Carruth said. (Tr. 352)
The authorities are all to the effect, so far as we
are able to ascertain, that the misrepresentation of the
incmne of property is the misrepresentation of a fact
and if false is the basis for an action for fraud. The law
is thus stated in 23 Am. Jur. 841, Sec. 68:
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··A false representation by an owner of land,
or his agent, seeking to dispose of the property
commercially, as to the present or past income,
profits or produce thereof or as to the arnount of
rent receiYed therefor is regarded as a state1nent
of fact upon which fraud nmy be predicated if
it is false since these are matters within the
representor's own knowledge. The same is true
of an assertion that the profits of a business are
or have been a certain sum annually, or a false
statement as to what a business now earns."
Numerous cases including the case of Hecht v.
Metzler, 14 Utah .J-08; -1-8 Pac. 37; 60 Am. St. Rep. 906
are cited in footnotes which sustain the doctrine announced in the text.
~~XS\YER

TO APPELLANTS' POINT II.

THE RESPONDENTS DID RELY UPON THE CLAIMED
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND
THE JURY SO FOUND.

rnder point two of appellants' brief, only a small
part of the testimony touching the reliance placed upon
plaintiffs alleged false representations is quoted. Upon
that phase of the case, defendant Clara A. White testified
that at the time :Mr. Lewis made the first visit to Farmington "he told me that he would like to see me have the
motel; that I could make more rnoney there, I could
make a thousand dollars a month, clear. He told me it
was producing a thousand dollars a month at that time.
He wasn't making so much out of it becuse all the time
he had rented it, leased it, and he only got $350.00 a
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1nonth for the monthly payments on the lease; that was
the first time that Mr. Lewis can1e up." (Tr. 47-48)
rrhat she had a conversation with Mr. Lewis both times
he wa~ up to Farmington about the income of the· motel;
"that at the second time he said he knew I would make
a thousand dollars a month down there." * * * "he told
1ne it had produced that. * * * :Miss Carruth when she
wa:-; there made that place pay, and she had made a
thousand dollars a month, but he didn't get much out
of it becuse he only rented it to her, he had leased it to
her and he got the $350.00 a month, and she never failed
to pay it, but he knew she was making a great deal more
than that." (Tr. 49-50) That Mr. Lewis told her that
l\Ir. Lyons was in charge of the place and she could get
any additional information from him; that when she
talked to l\Ir. Lyons, he told her that there were seven
1nen staying at the motel and each paid $2.50 per day.
(Tr. 50) In answer to the question "Now did you believe
and rely upon what Mr. Lewis told you about the income
from this motel?" Mrs. White answered, "I most certainly did, after being repeated several times." Upon
being asked, '"Would you have bought this place if you
had known it wasn't producing that amount?" She
answered, "Oh, my no." Mrs. White further testified
that she told Mr. Lewis that she had no means to pay
for the motel except what she could make in operating
the motel. (Tr. 51) It should be noted that Mr. Lewis
admitted that Mrs. White so informed him. (Tr. 357)
Mrs. White was cross-examined at some length, but
her testimony was the same as on her direct examination.
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She did ~ay "there wa~ a minute's doubt in 1ny n1ind
"·hen he tir~t told 1ne th~1t. but after repeatedly telling
me, ·why I belieyed it." (Tr. 59) :Jln~. \Vhite was further
asked about her testinHmy given on a deposition when
she testified that she didn't re1nmnber what she said
when :Mr. Lewis told her \Yhat the nwtel was bringing
in, but that she probably laughed at him, that she did
not know why she probably laughed at 1fr. Lewis, but
when he told her over and over again she believed hin1.
(Tr. 60-61)
The defendant Kathryn Grange White testified that
she didn't believe the statement about the motel bringing in a thousand dollars a month when such statement
was first 1nade by ~Ir. Lewis; that she changed her mind
because :Jir. Lewis kept repeating it. (Tr. 303) On
cross-exanlination she testified that she did count the
number of times :Jir. Lewis repeated the amount of income produced by the motel before she believed him;
(Tr. 308) that she started believing him when he so
stated the third time and after he stated it the fourth
time, she did believe him. (Tr. 308) We shall have more
to say about the matter of the defendants believing the
statements about the income derived from the motel in
connecion with our discussion of point three of appellants' brief. If the evidence to which we have directed
the attention of the court does not support the finding
of the jury that the defendants relied upon the statements of the plaintiffs, it is difficult to conceive of a
case which will support such a finding.
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ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT THREE
THE RESPONDENTS HAD A RIGHT TO RELY UPON
THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY APPELLANTS.

Under their point three, plaintiffs contend and cite
cases which they claim show that the defendants had no
right to rely on the representations made by the plaintiffs as to the income derived from the motel.
At the outset we quote from some of the authorities
dealing with the question of the right to rely on representations made by one who seeks to sell his property.
Tlie right to rely on representations made by a
seller of property is discussed at some length in 23 Am.
Jur. 947, et seq., Sec. 146. At page 948 of the above
volume it is said that:
"The policy of the courts is, on the one hand,
to suppress fraud and, on the other, not to encourage negligence and inattention to one's own
interest. The rule of law is one of policy. Is it
better to encourage negligence in the foolish or
fraud in the deceitful? Either course has obvious
dangers. But judicial experience exemplifies that
the former is the less objectionable and hampers
less the administration of pure justice. The law
is not designed to protect the vigilant, or tolerably vigilant, alone, although it rather favors
them, but is intended as a protection to even the
foolishly credulous, as against the machinations
of the designedly wicked. It has also been frequently declared that as between the original
parties, one who has intentionally deceived the
other to his prejudice is not to be heard to say,
in defense of the charge of fraud, that the inno-
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cent party ought not to have trusted him or was
guilty of negligence in so doing. The· courts,
however, are not entirely in accord as to the
circumstances under which fraudulent representations may be relied on, although it cannot perhaps
be denied that negligence as a defense in cases
of fraud has been in danger of being pushed too
far. There would seem to be no doubt that while,
in the ordinary business transactions of life, men
are expected to exercise reasonable prudence,
and not to rely upon others, with whom they deal,
to care for and protect their interest, this requirement is not to be carried so far that the law shall
ignore or protect positive, intentional fraud successfully practiced upon the simple-minded or
unwary."
Of the smne import is the law announced in 37 C.J.
Sec. 102, page 406 et seq.
We shall not review the numerous cases cited in
the footnotes, but shall direct the court's attention to
two cases which show the trend of judicial authority.
In the case of Morrison v. Goodspeed, et al.~ 100 Colo.
470; 68 Pac. 2d 459, it is held:
"Where n1isrepresen tation is such as would
tend to induce a party to enter into contract,
or would be part of inducement, inference is that
he acted on inducement, unless he knew facts
or avowedly did not rely on misrepresentations,
since one making false representation in respect
of material matter to rely on defense that transaction was not entered into on faith of representation must be able to prove that there was no
reliance on representation."
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The foregoing quotation is from the syllabus which
reflects the opinion of the Court.
ln the case of Carpenter et al. v. Hamilton, 62 Pac.
(2d) 1397 cited on page 12 of appellants' brief, it is said
that:
"Purchasers of realty had right to rely on
representations made by vendor concerning matters of fact which were unknown to them, without
making inquiry concerning truth thereof, and
vendor could not evade consequences of any
fraudulent statements he may have made by
showing that means of knowledge of truth were
easily available to purchaser."
The foregoing quotation is likewise from the syllabus and reflects the doctrine announced in the opinion.
In this case the appellants not only failed to offer
any evidence that respondents did not rely on the representations 1nade by appellants, but such evidence as
they did offer shows that the respondents had a right
to rely on such misrepresentations particularly as to
the arnount of income that may have been derived from
the motel. Thus plaintiff, Clyde C. Lewis, when he was
called the second time testified in effect that the property
should rent for $600.00 a month; that if the lessee got
$400.00 a month that should be sufficient. (Tr. 356-357)
Mr. Lyons, one of the plaintiffs' witnesses testified
that the property should bring in a thousand dollars
a month. (Tr. 320) Mr. Jensen, one of counsel for plaintiffs and a witness called in behalf of the plaintiffs, testified that $1000.00 a 1nonth is less than the property
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should bring in. (Tr. 390) Indeed, after allowing for
:25 to 30 per cent for Yaemwy, he placed the probable
amount of incon1e at $-l:-l-70.00 with a net incorne of
$3SC)U.Ul) per year. ( Tr. ~iSO-~)Sl) Indeed, by using the
motel for a maternity hmne or a hmne for old people
or for B.Y.r. students, .Jlr. Jensen would have far in
excess of that anwunt. (Tr. 390-391)
Thmnas \Y. Davies placed the probable incmne of
the rnotel at $1565.00 per nwnth. (Tr. 37) In light of
this testimony, is it any wonder that the defendants
relied upon the staternents of plaintiffs. Apparently
any one of the expert witnesses called by the plaintiffs
would have been taken in by the statements as to the
income that \Yas and had been produced. We can find
nothing in the cases cited by the appellants that indicates
that defendants were without right to rely upon the
representations n1ade by the plaintiff.
Of course, if one goes and exarnines property as
was done in the case of Carpenter v. Hamilton, cited by
appellants, and sees that the floors of the building were
uneven and other visible defects existed in the building,
the purchaser could not be heard to say that he relied
upon representations which were contrary to the obvious
facts. There was nothing in what the defendants saw
which may be said to prevent the motel from bringing
in the income of $1000.00 per month. Quite the contrary as is testified to by the witnesses for the plaintiff
to whose evidence we have heretofore directed the court.
Surely the defendants had a right to rely upon the representations made by the plaintiffs without holding up
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the deal until they were able to locate Miss Carruth,
which might have consumed weeks or months as apparently no one knew where she could be found. We again
direct the attention of the court to the fact that when
the witnesses testified to the damages, such testimony
was limited to the fact that the property was not producing the income which plaintiffs represented it was
producing.
On page 16 of appellants' brief, it is said that subsequent to the time respondents were told that the motel
was and had been producing one thousand dollars per
month, they learned the property was producing a little
over one-half the amount represented. So far as this
record shows, the motel never did produce a little over
one-half the amount represented, but only a little over
one-third of the amount represented. Moreover, defendants did not learn that the property did not have an
income of $1000.00 per month until long after they signed
the contract. As we read the Carpenter case upon which
appellants seem to so strongly rely when applied to the
evidence in this case makes against and not in favor of
appellants' contention.

ANSVVERING POINT FOUR OF APPELLANTS'
BRIEF
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON RIGHT TO RELY.

As is held by the cases cited, both the appellants and
respondents under point three of appellants' brief, the
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respondents had a right to rely upon the representations
made by the appellant~.
In the ea~e of Stanley Tnu.·t Co. v. Elery, 22 Pac.
{2d) G72, it is said that the pleadings and evidence in
that ea~e justified the sub1nission of the question of the
right of the purchaser of the property there involved
to rely upon the representations 1nade to such purchaser. In this case there are no facts pleaded and no
evidence was received tending to show that defendants
did not have a right to rely on the representations made
to the1n. ~-\_s is held in the case of Morris on v. Goodspeed
supra, the burden was on the plaintiffs to establish that
the defendants did not rely on the representations made
to them. The appellants failed to allege or offer any
proof that the defendants did not rely on the statements
made to them. Defendants testified that they did rely
upon such statements. The fact that Mrs. White had
no income to pay the installments provided for in the
contract except such as was produced by the motel,
which fact plaintiff Clyde C. Lewis admitted she conveyed to him, and the further fact as testified to by
plaintiff and his expert witness to the fact that the
property should produce an income of $1000.00 per
month, all show that defendants had a right, as a matter
of law, to rely on the representations made to them.
Moreover, the request made by the plaintiffs with
respect to the right of the defendants to rely upon the
representations was not only apparently made after
the verdict was reduced, but the request is fatally defective.
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In plaintiffs' request for instructions to the Jury
there appears this language :

''-±. You are instructed that even if the
plaintiff, Clyde Lewis, made the statements that
the income from the motel was one thousand dollars a month, prior to the signing of the contract,
if you find from the evidence, that the defendants
had reasonable opportunity to determine the
truth or falsity of said statement, they had no
right to rely upon the statements and are not
entitled to damages for such false statement."
Such an instruction to the jury is so general as to
be of no value to the jury. What is meant by reasonable
opportunity? Does it mean that the defendants had no
right to rely upon the representations made by the plaintiffs and to enter into a contract in reliance thereon until
they had ascertained where Miss Carruth was and found
out fron1 Miss Carruth what she had to say about the
income she had received. We have not found a case,
and none has been cited by appellants, that lays down
any such a requirement. It has frequently been held
by this court that it is error to give general instructions
because they are calculated to mislead the jury and that
instructions should be made applicable to the evidence.
Belnap v. Widdison, 32 Utah 246, 90 Pac. 197; Farmers
& Merchants Bank v. Jensen, 64 Utah 609, 232 Pac. 1084;
Jensen v. Utah Light and Ry. Co., 42 Utah 415, 132 Pac.
8; Everts v. Warrell, 58 Utah 238, 197 Pac. 1043. If, for
example, the plaintiffs claimed it was the duty of the
defendants to seek out l\1iss Carruth and ascertain from
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her the incon1e of the nwtel, they should have so requested. \Y e haYe no doubt but that such an instruction
would have been error, and yet that seen1s to be the
only thing ~ngge~ted that defendants should have done
that they did not do.
~-\XS\YERIXU

POlXT FIYE OF APPELLANTS'
BRIEF

THE FINDINGS OF THE JURY THAT THE VALUE
OF THE ~IOTEL PROPERTY WAS $42,000.00 HAD IT
BEEN AS REPRESENTED IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

The price fixed by the tenns of the con tract was
$±2,500.00. (See plaintiffs' Exhibit A) The plaintiff
Clyde C. Lewis testified that he should be getting about
$600.00 a month for the property; that $400.00 a month
should pay for all operating expenses; (Tr. 357) that
the reasonable market value at the time it was sold was
the price for which it was sold. (Tr. 21) Mr. Butterworth, a witness called by the plaintiffs, testified that in
his opinion the motel was worth $42,000.00 as of April
26, 1949. (Tr. 29±)
Mr. Jensen, one of counsel for the plaintiffs, somewhat hesitatingly testified that a building with an income
of $1000.00 per month would run around $42,000.00. (Tr.
242) Thomas A. Heal, a witness called by defendants,
testified that if the property sold for and was worth
$42,500.00 with an income of $1000.00 per month, it would
be, in his opinion, worth $14,166.00 if the Income was
$350.00 per month. (Tr. 172-195)
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Mr. Atwood, a witness called by the defendants,
testified that if the motel had an income of $350.00 a
Inonth, it would have a market value of $14,165.00, if it
had an. income of $1000.00 a month it would not be far
out to put the market value at $42,500.00. (Tr. 147-148)
Ralph Halm, a witness called by the defendants,
testified that if the motel was producing $1000.00 per
month, it would, in his opinion, be worth about $42,000.00.
(Tr. 242) It will be seen that all of the witnesses of
both the plaintiffs and defendants were of the opinion
that if the motel was producing $1000.00 per month,
its probable value at the time the contract was entered
into was $42,000.00, or $42,500.00 the amount for which
it sold.
Counsel for plaintiffs have cited cases such as De-

Freitas v. Town of Suisun, 149 Pac. 553 which holds
that the income produced by property is not conclusive
of Inarket value. We have no quarrel with the doctrine
there announced. None of the witnesses who testified
made the claim that market value was determined exclusively by its income. They did testify that income was
a very important element in fixing market value. All
of the witnesses who testified as to market value had
examined the motel and from such examination, their
familiarity with values together with the income derived
from the motel and the cost of operation, etc., they fixed
the market value. That is, as we understand, the proper,
if not the only way, to determine market value.
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ANS\VERlNG APPELLANTS' POINT SIX
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT WAIVED THEIR ACTION
FOR FRAUD.

Appellants' clain1 that respondents have waived
the fraud perpetrated upon then1 is without support in
either the evidence or the pleadings.
It is, of course, elementary that before one may
be held to have waived a right for damages sustained
on account of fraud perpetrated upon hi1n, he must have
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud. Such
doctrine is recognized by all of the cases cited by plaintiffs in support of their sixth point.
The law with respect to waiver of fraud is thus
stated in 2-! Am. J ur. page 34, Sec. 209 :
"If with full knowledge of the fraud a defrauded party intentionally waives or condones
it, he cannot thereafter claim damages for the
fraud. To invoke the rule of waiver, however,
it has been held to be essential to show that the
defrauded party intentionally condoned the fraud
affirmed the contract and abandoned all right to
recover damages for the fraud, with full knowledge thereof. The affirmance must be equivalent
to ratification. The question of outright waiver
is one of intent and it is essential to such waiver
that the victim possess full knowledge of the
fraud practiced upon him and that he intends to
affirm the contract and abandon his right to recover damages for the loss resulting from fraud.
Hence to constitute such a waiver in any case,
the defrauded party must act with full knowledge
of his rights, and of the material facts constituting the fraud."
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\Ve again call the attention of the Court to the testimony of ~1 rs. White in so far as the same may shed
light on her knowledge of the falsity of the representations made to her about the income of the motel at the
ti1ne it is elaimed she waived her right to maintain an
action for fraud.
On cross-examination, .Mrs. White was asked:

''Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.

Did ~·ou ask him (I\lr. Lewis) where l\fiss
Carruth was~
K o, I don't think I did.
You doubted his statement about the fact
that it could earn a thousand dollars a month,
yet you ~ay you didn't ask him where Miss
Carruth was ·~
No.
You weren't interested in talking to Miss
Carruth about how much she made~
I was only interested in what he was telling
me.
\Yell, he told you l\1.iss Carruth had made a
thousand dollars. Now I say you weren't
interested in talking with Miss Carruth personally to find out what she had made, you
weren't interested in that, were you~
At the time I don't think anyone knew where
she was.
Did you ask Mr. Lewis where she was~
No, I have asked many other people where
she was, but she wasn't in Utah.
When did you ask other people where she
was~

A. Different conversations with my neighbors.
Q. Prior to the signing of the contract, whom
did you ask~
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~\. I c.ouldn't reme1nber the people.
Q. Did you ask ~lr. Lyon'?
A. No, I don't know that I did.
Q. And you didn't ask Mr. Lewis Y
_\, Xo.''

There were other questions and answers of similar
import. (Tr. 80) She was then asked: "Mrs. White
c.an you say now of your own knowledge that this motel
never brought into the owner of it a thousand dollars
per 1nonth '? ~\. X o.'' Further she testified that she
was told the 1notel brought in a thousand dollars a month
and that is all she knew. (Tr. 81) She further testified
that when she first went into the motel the main highway was not torn up; that the highway was torn up on
.May 15th and remained torn up until Oc.tober; that while
the highway was torn up, it was nec.essary to go around
to the bac.k to get into the motel; that the fact that the
road was torn up 1nay have affected the income of the
motel; (Tr. 82) that the road was finished about October
1st; that notwithstanding the road was torn up, she
made her payments quite regularly, but in October the
pipe plant shut down and she lost her boarders.
(Tr. 83) Mrs. White was also asked: "Did you ever
contact Miss Carruth to find out whether or not there
was insulation~ A. No, I never talked to Miss Carruth." (Tr. 97)
Mrs. White was asked on her cross-examination
these questions and she gave these answers:

"Q.

Mrs. White, did you ever after this contract
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A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.

A.
Q.

was signed ask for an extension of time in
which to make payments~
T don't know just what you mean, an extension of time.
Well, if you are not able to make a payment
say on the 20th, did you ever ask to make it
on the 30th or the next month~
Yes, I have talked with Mr. Lewis about that.
Did you ever talk to Mr. Jensen at any time
about extending the time for payment~
The only time I talked to Mr. Jensen was
after I had received a notice of eviction, that
I wasn't keeping my payments up. I went
to the office and tried to fix things with him
and let me have a chance to pay up. I think
at that time I only had one boarder in the
house.
Was that after the first notice in May~
I don't remember just when it was.
Did Mr. Jensen agree to give you more time~
No, he said he would talk with l\1:r. Lewis.
He doubted he would do it or not.
Did he ever get in touch with you thereafter
with regard to a different arrangement~
No. I had to borrow money to go and pay
him; that arrangement was made.
When you came into Mr. Jensen's office
wasn't something discussed about the payment of $100.00 a week until the arrears were
paid~

A.

Yes, I tried to get him to let me pay it that
way and he said Mr. Lewis wouldn't do it,
he knew he wouldn't.
Q. Didn't Mr. Jensen write you it would be all
right to do that~
A. No, sir."
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~he

further testified that ~he had the privilege to
pay $100.00 a 'Yeek after she had the payment8 all caught
up. (Tr. 109) On further ero~~-examination, Mrs. White
testified that she was not given any terms by Mr. Jensen
to pay up what ~he was behind in her payments, but
that her attorney :J[r. Dalton paid nwney that was in
arrears on the contract. (Tr. 112) There was received
in evidence a receipt, Defendants' Exhibit 3, which recites June 1:2, 1950 received frmn Clara A. White, paid
by Don :Jlack Dalton, Sixteen Hundred Ninety-four and
14/100 Dollars ($1694.14), Reinstatement of Contract
of Clara ~-\.. \Yhite and Kathryn Grange White with
Clyde C. Lewis for purchase of motel at Pleasant Grove.
Perris S. Jensen.
:Jiiss Carruth testified that she first met :Mrs. White
when the Subpoena was served upon her to appear at
the trial, which was one week ago Saturday.
The foregoing testimony is all that we can find in
the record which has any bearing on the 1natter of whether or not ~Irs. White had any knowledge of the falsity
of the representations made to her. Needless to say,
such evidence falls far short of showing, or for that
matter, tending to show that Mrs. White had full knowledge of the misrepresentations made to her at the time
she paid the $1694.14 on the installments that according
to the contract were past due.
At this point we digress to remark that we do not
concede that the payment of the $1694.14 was to reinstate the contract for the simple reason that the contract
was never legally revoked, nor were the plaintiffs en-
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titled to take possession by reason of the service of the
notice of eviction. Much less may it be said that the
plaintiffs conferred upon the defendants any favor by
relieving them of $1694.14 on the contract which had
been secured by misrepresentation. We shall have more
to say about this phase of the case later on in this brief.
At this point suffice it to say that none of the cases cited
under Point 6 of appellants' brief and the claim of the
appellants to the effect that the respondents waived the
fraud are applicable here, because of a total failure of
evidence that the respondents knew the facts constituting the misrepresentations at the time of the transaction
with respect to paying the installments that were in
arrears.
Moreover there is no pleading alleging that the
defendants had waived the fraud claimed by them, nor
did plaintiffs request the court to amend their pleadings
to allege any such a claim.
Counsel for the appellants recognize the necessity
of pleading and proving waiver of a fraud, but claim
that the pleadings may be amended in this Court. No
case is cited from this jurisdiction where such a practice
has been permitted, and we believe none can be found.
On the contrary, this court has repeatedly and so far
as we can find has uniformly held that it may review
only such matters as are presented to the trial court
and it may not consider or review matters which are
presented for the first time in this court. Among the
cases so holding are: Simpson v. Denver afl'l-d R. G. R. Co.,
43 Utah 105, 134 Pac. 883; Smith v. Sinal ad Lood &
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Fruit Co._. -1~ rtah -1-13, 1~3~ Pac. 3;)ti: Stcwt v. Halt Lake
and 0. R. Co., -11 Utah 318, 1~7 Pae. ~()7; ll' oolf v. Guy,
4S rtah ~39, 158 Pac. ISS: United States Buildi.ng &
Loan Assn. Y. Jlidrale Home Finance Corp., 86 Utah
506, -1-1 Pac. (~d) 1090.
Appellants seen1 to deriYe son1e comfort fron1 the
provisions of Rule 15b of lTtah Rules of Civil Procedure.
That rule an1ong other things provides that :
"If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
grotmd that it is not within the issues made by
the pleadings, the Court may allow the pleadings
to be amended 'vhen the presentation of the
1nerits of the action will be subserved thereby
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the Court
that the admission of such evidence would prejudice hin1 in maintaining his action or defense
upon the merits. The Court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting
party to meet such evidence."
Near the conclusion of the trial, defendant Clyde C.
Lewis was again called and by his attorney asked:

"Q.

i\Ir. Lewis, after .Jirs. White took possession
of the property and she became in arrears
on her payments, did she at any time come
and ask for an extension of the time of payment~

A. Yes she did.
Q. Do you recall when that was~
A. Well after she had been there a short time
she got in arrears.
Q. About when was it she came to you~
~IR. HANSEN : If the Court please, we
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object to this testimony as heing immaterial.
'Vhat difference does it make~
MR. RICHARDS: This is material because
if there have been any favors after the discovery
of fraud, then the favors asked for and granted
is a waiver of the fraud. That is why it is material.
MR. HANSEN: No such pleading is made.
~1:R. RICHARDS: We don't need to, all we
need to do is show that in rebuttal." (Tr. 370)
Later on counsel for defendants stated that: "I wish
the record to show if counsel seeks to establish a waiver
of any fraud the pleadings fail to allege that, and having
failed to allege it is not an issue in this case."
THE COURT: Objection sustained. (Tr. 372)
No request was made to amend the pleadings to set
up a waiver. The only other mention of the waiver was
when the court asked counsel for the plaintiffs if they
had any objection to the court's instructions to the jury,
and counsel for the plaintiffs stated that: "The plaintiffs
except to the Court's ruling denying the plaintiffs the
right to show that the defendants, after having knowledge of the fraud, requested an extension of time for payment of delinquent payments, for the purpose of showing
that defendants waived the fraud, if any." (Tr. 408)
It will be observed that under Rule 15b when objection is Inade to evidence because not within the issue the
procedure provided for by the rule is to seek an amendment of the pleadings. That was not done and there can
be no valid basis for complaint on account of pleadings
not having been mnended when there is no request to
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amend. Probably these conunent~ are not nece8~ary because appellants 1nake no cmnplaint directed to such proceedings, but their claim is that the transcript of the evidence of ~Irs. \Yhite shows a waiYer. \Ye have already
directed the attention of the Court to such evidence and
we subnrit that by no stretch of her evidence n1ay it be
said that defendants waived the fraud. :Moreover, if
there were son1e evidence tending to show a waiver of the
fraud, the defendants would have had a right to have
such question subn1itted to the jury for its determination.
There being no issue raised by the pleadings on the
question of waiver, there was nothing to submit to the
jury on any such matter.
From what we have said, we do not concede that if
plaintiffs had been able to show that Mrs. White asked
for additional time to pay the amount she was in arrears
after she discovered the fraud that she would thereby
have waived the fraud. The authorities as we read them
require either a new agreement or a substantial concession before the defrauded person may be said to have
waived the fraud, even if such person has full knowledge
of the fraud. We have heretofore cited the authorities
touching that phase of the case.
We have heretofore discussed this case with the end
in view of showing that the trial court did not err in any
of the particulars urged by the appellants. It may be that
we should let the matter rest there, but we are mindful
that the courts do not always accept the theory of a case
which is adopted by appellants. At times appellate, as
well as trial courts, dispose of a case on a theory other
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tltan that advanced by counsel. For fear the court may
adopt a theory of this case not in accord with that which
apparently appellants have proceeded on, we shall discuss this case from the point of view which the defendants believe to be correct, and which the trial court apparently adopted in part at least in disposing of the
cause.
At the outset it should be kept in mind that the jury
was requested to and did find a special verdict on all of
the issues submitted to them and that neither of the parties were denied the right to have the jury pass on any
question of fact. It is, of course, elementary that when a
jury returns a special verdict finding the facts, it then
becomes the province of the court to determine the law
applicable to the facts so found.
In this case the defendants in their counterclaim
alleged that the plaintiffs represented to the defendants
that the motel was and had been producing $1000.00 per
n1onth, when in truth and in fact it was not and had not
been producing more than $225.00 per month, and that
because of such misrepresentations, the defendants had
been damaged in the sum of $30,000.00. The jury found
that the defendants did make the misrepresentations in
conformity with plaintiffs' allegations and evidence.
It is the general rule of law which has been followed
in this State that the measure of damages which a purchaser upon whom a fraud has been perpetrated is the
difference in actual market value of the property at the
time of its purchase and what its value would have been
if it had been as represented. Hecht v. Metzler, 14 Utah
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408: -!S Pac. 37. Ken near r. Pro·u·s, 81 Utah 135; 16 Pac.
(2d) 1094. ~-\defrauded purehaser, however, is not limited in his reeovery to such difference in value. He may
recover all dmnages, including special damages, which
are the natural and proxilnate result of the- fraud perpetrated upon hin1. The law is thus stated in 37 C.J.S.,
page 470:

"The general rule applicable to the measure
of damages for fraud is that such an amount
should be awarded to plaintiff as will compensate
hun for the loss occasioned by the fraud or as it
has been expresse-d plaintiff is entitled to recover
damages adequate to the injury which he has sustained. Plaintiff can recover the entire amount
of his loss occasioned by the fraud, but the recovery must be limited to the actual loss. The
number of false representations made does not
affect the measure of damages."
Xumerous cases are cited in the foot notes to the text
in support of the text, but as the rule announced by the
text is the law applicable to torts generally, we shall not
burden the court with a review of the same. See also 27
C.J. 83-84 and cases cited in note 86.
In light of the fact that the motel was by the Court
awarded to the plaintiffs, it may be doubted if the difference in the actual market value of the property and its
value if it had been as represented is of controlling importance. The defendants have lost the entire property
and thus its value has ceased to be of any concern to them.
What they have actually lost is the money they paid
on the property and the difference in the income which
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they actually received from the property and the amount
they would have received if the rnotel was and had beeu
producing the income represented.
We shall devote the remainder of this Brief to a discussion of fact found by the jury from that point of view.
Respondents are not seeking a reversal or modification of the decree and judgment, but they do wish to
present certain matters in the nature of cross assignments of errors in support of the judgment appealed
from.

RESPONDENTS' POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY APPARENTLY HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO DECLARE
A FORFEITURE OF THE CONTRACT.

RESPONDENTS' POINT TWO
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVING BROUGHT THEIR ACTION
FOR POSSESSION OF THE MOTEL AND HAVING SECURED AND RETAINED A DECREE AWARDING THEM
THE MOTEL, DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT FOR THE MONEY PAID AS A PART OF THE PURCHASE PRICE OF THE MOTEL TOGETHER WITH THE
DAMAGE WHICH THEY SUSTAINED BECAUSE OF THE
MISREPRESENTATION AS TO THE INCOME FROM THE
MOTEL.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS'
POINTS
RESPONDENTS' POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY APPARENTLY HOLD-
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lNG THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO DECLARE
A FORFEITURE OF THE CONTRACT.

By their cmnplaint the plaintiffs sought to secure a
forfeiture of all of the rights of the defendants in and to
the contract for the purchase of the motel. The provisions upon which they rely for their claimed right to declare a forfeiture is contained in a Uniform Sales Contract such as in conunon use here in Salt Lake and Utah
generally. \Ye have heretofore in this brief quoted the
provision so relied upon by the plaintiffs. In their answer the defendants alleged that the provision relied
upon by the plaintiffs for their claimed right to declare
a forfeiture was and is void because the same constitutes a penalty and as such is against public policy. In
light of the fact that this court has very recently, in the
case of Spencer 1/.Perkins,not yet reported,construed and
passed upon the same provision as that relied upon by the
plaintiffs herein, we shall be content to refer to that case
where the other cases from this jurisdiction dealing with
the question of a forfeiture as distinguished from liquidated damages are collected. Suffice it to say that the
facts in this case bring it within the rule that to permit
the plaintiffs to declare a forfeiture would constitute
a penalty and not liquidated damages. It will be seen
that if the plaintiffs should be permitted to declare a
forfeiture, such claimed right accrued the instant the
first installment of $31.50 became past due and owing
for thirty days. To appr<?ve the right to declare a forfeiture under such circumstance has repeatedly been
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condemned by this court as will be seen from the case of
S]Jencer v. Perkins, supra, and the cases there cited.
It may be that it is not of controlling importance
in this case to determine whether or not the contract
between the parties thereto was or was not subject to
forfeiture. That is to say, if the contract became subject to forfeiture because of the failure of the defendants
to keep up the installment payments, such failure was
brought about because of the fraud perpetrated upon
the defendants by the plaintiffs in that if the motel was
and had been producing only about 1/3 of the income
that plaintiffs represented, the inability of the defendants to Ineet the payment was directly brought about by
the misrepresentations of the plaintiffs. Obviously if the
property was and had been producing an income of
$1000.00 per month, it in all probability would have continued to produce a similar income and if it had produced
such income the defendants would have had no difficulty
in making the installment payments. On the other hand,
if, as both the defendant J\1rs. White and the plaintiff
Clyde C. Lewis testified, that Mrs. White had no income
or means to meet the installment payments except such
as could be secured from the income of the motel, it
became an absolute certainty that the defendants could
not meet the installment payments because the installment payments amounted to more than the income, all of
which the defendant Clyde C. Lewis admitted the second
time he was on the witness stand, but still he, according
to further admission, did not convey such information
to the defendants. Under such circumstances, part of
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the damage suffered by the defendants wa~ t lw down
payment on the nwtel.
Before concluding this phase of the case, it may be
observed that the defendants, at the conclusion of the
case, did not resist the awarding of the uwtel to the plaintiffs if the defendants could be awarded the dmnages
which they had sustained.

RESPONDEXTS' POINT TWO
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVING BROUGHT THEIR ACTION
FOR POSSESSION OF THE MOTEL AND HAVING SECURED AND RETAINED A DECREE AWARDING THEM
THE MOTEL, DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT FOR THE MONEY PAID AS A PART OF THE PURCHASE PRICE OF THE MOTEL TOGETHER WITH THE
DAMAGE WHICH THEY SUSTAINED BECAUSE OF THE
MISREPRESENTATION AS TO THE INCOME FROM THE
MOTEL.

The defendants in this case are not seeking to be
restored to the possession of the premises. What the
defendants do claim is that the plaintiffs did not have
and do not have a right to a forfeiture of the payments
that the defendants made on the contract, but on the contrary, the defendants are entitled to be reimbursed for
the money paid on the contract as a part of their damages. In other words, the plaintiffs have committed an
anticipatory breach of their contract by refusing to be
bound by the contract and having secured and retained
a decree awarding them the motel and the personal property therein contained, the defendants are entitled to
have awarded to then1, as a part of their damages, the
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money which they paid on the contract. The authorities
are generally to the effect that a cancellation of a cont rad before the time for performance, which amounts to
a refusal to perfonn it at any time, gives the adverse
part the option to treat the entire contract as broken
and to sue immediately for damages or for a total breach.
12 Am. Jur. 970. To the same effect see 17 C.J.S., page
973. N mnerous cases from both Federal and State courts
which support the text are cited in foot notes among
which is the case of Jordan v. Mads en, et al., 69 Utah
11 :2 ; :25:2 Pac. 570.
The defendants however will still be reimbursed for
only a part of the damages which they have sustained
by being awarded merely the money that they paid on
the property. It is a matteT of common knowledge that
the income from commercial or income producing property remains substantially the same in the absence of
some economic or physical change. In this case the
plaintiffs having represented that the property was and
had been producing an income of a $1000.00 per month,
the defendants had a right to rely on such representations, and so relying and believing that the property
would continue to produce substantially such income· for
at least a reasonable time thereafter. The defendants
remained in possession of the property from May 1, 1949
to the date of the judgment which was signed on October
4, 1951, a period of 29 months and 4 days. During that
period of time if the property had produced an income
of $1000.00 per month as represented instead of the actual income of $350.00 per month, or $650.00 per month
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more than the actual inc01ne, or a total for the ~~) uwnths
and .f days of $18,93-!.00, this added to the amount paid
down on the property of $10,:25ti.~l auwunts to $29,190.21. In addition to that the defendants paid on the installments the stun of $33-±4.1-± (R. 7) and spent in enlarging the kitchen and fruit roo1n the su1u of $700.00 of her
own money.
Before concluding our discussion of the foregoing
figures, we digress to observe that in those cases where
a defendant establishes a right to recover on a counterclaim, the usual practice is to set off the amount recovered on the counterclaim fron1 the amount recovered,
if any, on the Complaint. Such is, in proper cases, the
practice approved by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 13 c, i and j. So also do the Rules of Civil Procedure, Table III, pp. 187-188 provide that:
"On and after the effective date of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure the provisions of Title
104, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 as amended
(Code of Civil Procedure), will have no further
force and effect except the following which are
retained by law."
Among the laws enumerated which are to be retained
is Chapter 60, Forceable Entry and Detainer (See page
188). It would thus seem that while a Counterclaim for
fraud may be set up in an action for unlawful detainer,
a judgment recovered for fraud in the procurement of
the contract which is the basis of the action for unlawful
detainer, cannot defeat such action, for unlawful de-
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tainer or even be set up as a counterclaim except for the
purposes of the trial. Such Reems to have been the doctrine entertained by the trial court when it rendered
it8 oral decision. (R. 411) Such also seems to be the
law in this juri8dictionas announced in suchcaseasDunbar
r. Hansen, GS [tah 398, 250 Pac. 982. Be that as it may,
it will be noted that the amount of the money judgment
finally entered by the court below in favor of the defendants was the amount as found by the jury as the difference in the actual value of the property and what its
value would have been if its income had been as represented, less the amount owing on the contract at the
time plaintiff sought to declare a forfeiture, also less
three times the rental value from the time of the attempted cancellation of the con tract to the date of the trial.
Thus the verdict of the jury found that on the date the
contract was executed, the actual value of the property
was $14,000.00 and that if it had been producing an incOine of $1000.00 per month as represented, it would
have been worth $42,000.00. The difference is thus $28,000.00. The defendants were in arrears on their installInent payments at the time the plaintiffs sought a forfeiture of the contract in the sum of $1087.36. (Tr. 7)
The jury found the reasonable rental value of the property from the date the plaintiffs sought to cancel the contract to the date of the trial was $100.00 per month, a
period of thirteen months and seven days. \Vhen the
rent for that period is trebled, it amounts to $3970.00.
The jury found that the costs of the improvements to the
kitchen and front ro01n was $800.00, but $100.00 of that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

67 '
amotmt was secured fro1n the salP of ehrmue <'hairs belonging to the 1notel. By deducting frmn the $~S,OOO.OO
the amount that defendant~ wt\re in arrPar8 in the su1n
of $1087.36 plus the $~3~)10.00, we haYP $~S,OOO.OO less
$j057.36 = $~~,9-!:~.6-t. By adding to the $~~,9-!2.64 the
$700.00 which defendant8 expended of their own nwney
in improving the motel, we haYe $23,G-t:2.64. It will be
seen that the trial court deducted from the $28,000.00 all
that could possibly be said to be due on the contract. Obviously the court was without authority to set off any
judgment for dmnages to which defendants 'vere entitled against installments on the contract that were not
yet due. It may also here be observed that when there
was deducted from the amount that defendants were entitled to have awarded to them as damages a sufficient
amount to place the contract in good standing, the contract could not then be forfeited.
It will be seen that the amount of the judgment actually rendered in favor of the defendants in the sum
of $23,642.64 is substantially less than defendants are
entitled to if and when they are permitted to recover
the money they have actually paid for the property and
the improvement thereof, plus the difference between the
income that they received and the amount that they
would have received if the income of the property had
been as represented. The $18,934.00 which we have heretofore computed does not take into account the fact that
Miss Carruth paid $350.00 a month for only 4 or 5 months
when the rent was reduced to $300.00 per month for the
remainder of the year. (Tr. 123) Nor does it take into
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account that the income of the motel during the approximate month that Mr. Lyon was operating the motel was
only $255.00.
1'his Court being, as it is, committed to the doctrine
that a purchaser who is defrauded in the purchase of real
e8tate is entitled to recover as damages the differences between the actual market value of the property and its
value if the same had been as represented, there would
seem to be no escape from applying that doctrine to the
income derived from the property, especially where it is
purchased primarily because of its income, and award
to the defrauded purchaser the difference between the
income that was received and the income that would have
been received if the property had been as represented.
Indeed, unless such doctrine is applied to the facts in
this case, the defendants are without redress for the
fraud perpetrated upon them beyond the recover of the
price they paid on the motel. In such case, the defendants will have devoted their time for a period of twentynine months and four days in operating the motel at a
loss of both their time and money.
We are mindful that the defendants could not, for
an indefinte period, recover as damages the difference
between the income of the property and such income if
the same had been as represented. In this case, the defendants had no means to protect their interest in the
motel after the action was brought by the plaintiffs to
cancel the con tract except to retain possession of the
property until the case was adjudicated. Had the defendants surrendered possession of the motel pursuant
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to plaintiffs' acUon, they would have forfeited all rights
thereto and the plaintiffs would then be in a position to
assert that they were enUtled to retain the property
and all money paid on the contract and i1nprovmnents
made to the motel as liquidated drunages. Such a re~mlt
would be unconscionable.
It may be that what we have said in our discussion
of Respondents· Points, which are in the nature of cross
assignments of error, have served no useful purpose because the appellants make no claim that a wrong measure
of damages was applied by the trial court, or that the
judgment appealed from is not supported by the special
verdict found by the jury. If such be the view of the
court, it "'ill, of course, confine its review to the points
raised by the appellants, in any case we submit that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs.
Respectfully submitted,
DON MAGK DALTON
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorneys for Respondents
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